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David Reiss 
Rating Agencies and Reputational Risk 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This essay is a lightly-edited version of a talk given at the University of Maryland School 
of Law and the Journal of Business & Technology Law’s Conference on the Subprime 
Meltdown in October 2008.  It briefly reviews the reputational risk literature and applies 
it to the rating agency industry.  In particular, it looks at three of the inputs into reputation 
-- trust, transparency, and leadership -- and evaluates how rating agencies fared in the 
period leading up to the subprime meltdown.  It concludes that rating agencies did poorly 
when it came to all three of these reputational inputs. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358316
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David Reiss* 
Rating Agencies and Reputational Risk 
When I was invited to speak at the University of Maryland School of Law and the Journal 
of Business & Technology Law’s Conference on the Subprime Meltdown, I had been asked to 
discuss the role of rating agencies in the subprime meltdown.1 As I thought about what I would 
like to say in the midst of the worst financial crisis of our generation, perhaps the worst since the 
Great Depression, I asked myself, how well do I understand the breadth and depth of the crisis 
that we find ourselves in. Major pieces of legislation are being passed at breakneck speed, 
including the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,2 which is supposed to bail out our 
entire financial system and which comes on top of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bailout 
legislation enacted over the summer.3 Revelations about poor risk management in the financial 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Williams College; J.D., New York University School of Law. 
These are lightly edited remarks given as part of the Role of Credit Agencies and Insurance panel at the Maryland 
Journal of Business and Technology Conference on the Subprime Meltdown on October 3, 2008. Thanks to 
Schuyler Wiener for excellent research assistance. 
1 The three leading rating agencies are Standard & Poors, Moody’s Investors Services, and Fitch Ratings. Until 
recently, they effectively had an oligopoly in the market for credit ratings. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING 
AGENCIES 1–5 (2008) (reviewing recent history of rating agency industry through passage of Rating Agency Reform 
Act in 2006 which opened up industry to further competition) [hereinafter SEC SUMMARY REPORT]; David Reiss, 
Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage 
Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.  985, 1016–22 (2006) (discussing development of rating agency oligopoly). 
2 Pub. L. No. 110-343 (2008), Div. A, § 2, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified at 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 5201–5261 (LexisNexis 
2008)). 
3   The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289 (2008), 122 Stat. 2654 (codified at 12 
U.S.C.S. §§ 4501-4642 (LexisNexis 2008)). 
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services industry are also popping up with disturbing regularity.4 Keeping up with all of the 
details on all fronts is just not possible. 
When I realized that we are not yet able to put all of the details in perspective, I decided 
to take a step back from a technical approach to the conference’s subject and discuss more 
visceral topics, topics that derive from our shared fundamental social expectations. These topics 
are 
• Lying; 
• Cheating; 
• Stealing; 
• Trust; 
• Honor; and 
• The difference between right and wrong.5 
These topics compose the framework that Main Street (and probably many of us in the 
room) are using to understand the crisis that confronts them. And indeed, it is an appropriate 
framework, in many ways.6 So the good news is that you do not need to be an MIT Ph.D. to 
understand what this financial services crisis is fundamentally about—it is about, as much as 
anything else, the same topics that our gut instincts are screaming about.7 In academia, we need 
to give such a visceral subject a more measured name: we call it “reputational risk.”8 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Liam Pleven & Susanne Craig , The Financial Crisis: Congress Grills Former AIG Chiefs --- Lawmakers 
Ask Whether Executives Glossed Over Warnings About Risks Insurer Faced,  WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008, at A3; 
Floyd Norris, Lehman's Assurances Ring Hollow, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2008, at C1. 
5 See Ingo Walter, Reputational Risk and Conflicts of Interest in Banking and Finance: The Evidence So Far 7 (New 
York University Stern School of Business, Working Paper, Dec. 9, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=952682 at 7. 
6 See id. (explaining that such visceral topics are good framework because they “are probably as close as one comes 
to ‘constants’ in assessing business conduct”). 
7 Corporate greed and irresponsibility are two of the more pressing topics. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Beyond the Fat 
Cats, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at A29. 
8 See generally Walter, supra note 5, at 5–7. 
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The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision defines reputational risk as “the risk of 
significant negative public opinion that results in a critical loss of funding or customers.”9 This 
can play out in many ways: loss of clients who defect to competitors; lack of confidence in the 
firm that results in a higher cost of credit; increase in hiring and retention costs; reduction in 
business partners as they shift to competitors; and increases in regulation, litigation, and fines.10 
Big hits to reputation can lead to reduced earnings and increased volatility.11 And, indeed, 
reputational harm may pose a great threat to a financial firm.12 
Reputational risk can arise in many contexts: conflicts of interest may be improperly 
exploited and individuals can be guilty of professional misconduct.13 Moreover, firms can have 
poor “compliance and incentive systems;” poor leadership; and corporate cultures that encourage 
improper behavior.14 Harm to reputation may be intangible or occur incrementally, so that it is 
difficult to identify.15 Nonetheless, it is more typically the consequence of “management 
processes rather than discrete events.”16 And it is more likely to harm firms that present 
                                                 
9 BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT FOR ELECTRONIC BANKING AND ELECTRONIC 
MONEY ACTIVITIES 7 (1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs35.pdf. 
10 See Roland Gillet et al., Operational Risk and Reputation in the Financial Industry 2–3 (Working Paper, Feb. 28, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=967313; Jason Perry & Patrick de Fontnouvelle, Measuring 
Reputational Risk: The Market Reaction to Operational Loss Announcements 5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, 
Working Paper, Oct. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=861364; Walter, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
11 Gillet et al., supra note 10, at 3. 
12 See Robert G. Eccles et al., Reputation and Its Risks, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2007, at 104, 104 (“in an economy 
where 70% to 80% of market value comes from hard-to-assess intangible assets such as brand equity, intellectual 
capital, and goodwill, organizations are especially vulnerable to anything that damages their reputations.”); Walter, 
supra note 5, at 25–26 (justifying high cost of dealing with reputational risk by explaining that reputational losses 
can lead to “serious damage”).  
13 Id. at 3–4. 
14Id. 
15 Perry & de Fontnouvelle, supra note  10, at 4–5. 
16 Walter, supra note 5, at 4 (emphasis removed). 
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themselves as “reputational standard-setters.”17 A hit to reputation is likely to be read as a signal 
that the same behavior may repeat itself at a particular firm.18 
Rating agencies have clearly held themselves out as standard-setters that provide 
objective  and carefully-wrought opinions.19 Indeed, they claim to be limited by reputational 
restraints.20 I look at three of the inputs into reputation and see how they play out in the context 
of rating agencies: trust, transparency, and leadership. These three themes, writ large, can also 
help make sense of the broader financial crisis. 
We take trust for granted in good times, but the financial system cannot function without 
it. People are only willing to risk large sums of money if they are reasonably certain that the 
other parties to the transaction can fulfill their obligations. This is true whether you are lending 
money, buying insurance or just relying on another party to provide services relating to large 
sums of money, like a rating agency. 
Trust is all well and good, but if you cannot verify what the other party is telling you, 
trust comes to resemble faith more than anything else. When a financial system rests on faith and 
                                                 
17Id. 
18 See Walter, supra note 5, at 25-26 (noting that repeated scandals can lead to lower market valuation). 
19 See, e.g., Vickie Tillman, Letter to the Editor, Ratings of Securities are Defended and Criticized, Too, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 30, 2008, at A18 (Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services Executive V.P. writing, “[Standard and Poor’s] has 
long had in place policies and procedures to help preserve the integrity of our ratings opinions. Our analytical and 
commercial activities are maintained separately, ratings are assigned by committees, and our analysts’ compensation 
is not determined by the size of any fee.”). 
20 See John P. Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the 
Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement 15–16 (Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the 
Economy, Working Paper, Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267625; see also Beatriz Mariano, 
Do Reputational Concerns Lead to Reliable Ratings? 2 (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper, May 21, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1106653 (explaining importance of reputation to rating agencies). 
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suffers from an absence of transparency, you should be worried. A crisis of faith in the financial 
markets is called a panic. 
When times are good in the financial markets, leaders do not really stand out.  But when 
times are bad, leadership is of key importance.  Warren Buffett is a great example of someone 
who is perceived as a straight talker and his credibility has the power to stabilize distressed 
companies.21 The leadership of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Lehman Brothers did not have 
such credibility as the markets began to fall to pieces. That lack of credibility is no small part of 
the problem that those companies faced as they barreled toward insolvency.22  
Rating agencies did poorly when it came to all three of these reputational inputs.23 Their 
business model was based on serious conflicts of interest, conflicts that should and did 
undermine the trust that others had in them. Rating agencies were paid by the issuers who needed 
their ratings and the profit motive drove the agencies to recklessly expand the market for their 
services by giving higher ratings than merited to many mortgage-backed securities.24  
The rating agencies were also deficient when it came to transparency.  They helped 
investment banks to structure the transactions that they were to rate to an extent not known to the 
                                                 
21 See Ben Steverman, Can Buffett Rescue the Market?, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 2, 2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/oct2008/pi2008101_890140.htm (discussing how Warren Buffett’s 
credibility allows him to have “halo effect” on companies he chooses to invest in). 
22 See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Lehman’s Assurances Ring Hollow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2008, at C1. 
23 See Reiss, supra note 1; see also Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 
794–95 (2006) (discussing ratings agencies’ failures in 1990s). 
24 See generally Reiss, supra note 1 (describing how rating agencies sought to increase market for mortgage-backed 
securities ratings); Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings 
Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions (May 3, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475 (describing how rating agencies came to act as part of underwriting 
team for complex mortgage-backed securities). 
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rest of the world.25 They were integrally involved, for instance, in legitimizing subprime debt 
instruments like the collateralized debt obligation (CDO),26 securities that make up many of the 
toxic assets that are dragging down the balance sheets of so many financial firms.  The rating 
agencies also claimed that their very sophisticated rating models were reliable enough to predict 
with great accuracy the risk of default and delayed payment.27 It turns out however, that 
“sophisticated” was just a way of saying complex and confusing.28 Like many other financial 
players, it appears that their complex risk management models had some very simple 
assumptions undergirding them—national housing prices will never go down on a year-to-year 
basis, for one.29 
The leadership at the rating agencies set an ethos that clearly distorted the mission of 
these firms.30 The rating agencies did not properly monitor their employees to ensure that they 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Michel G. Crouhy, Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, The Subprime Credit Crisis of 07 8–10 (July 
9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112467. 
26 See Mason & Rosner, supra note 24, at 13–15 (noting that rating agencies were integral to determining 
“marketability” of CDOs). 
27 See generally SECURITIZATION: ASSET-BACKED AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 9.01(2) (Ronald S. 
Borod, ed., 2003) (providing summary of how rating agencies claim to test MBS collateral under Great Depression 
worst-case scenario). 
28 See Mason & Rosner, supra note 33, at 68 (“The ability to repackage [mortgage-backed securities] and call them 
[CDOs], with no fundamental change to their risk characteristics, in order to achieve an 
improved bond rating is the fundamental source of ratings arbitrage.”). 
29 See Peter L. Bernstein, Op-Ed., What Happens If We’re Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at BU5. 
30 Aaron Lucchetti, McGraw Scion Grapples With S&P's Woes—Chairman Helped Set Tone in Profit Push As 
Ratings Firms Feasted on New Products, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2008, at B1 (quoting Harold McGraw III, CEO of 
Standard & Poor’s parent corporation, McGraw-Hill, “[w]hat we do is provide access to the capital market. . . . If 
the market wants those kinds of products and the institutional investors want those products, then we move with the 
market and we're going to rate whatever.”). See generally SEC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-32 (reviewing 
conflicts of interest at rating agencies). 
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avoided even the most obvious conflicts of interest.31 There was a culture of understating risks in 
their ratings.32 They also failed to alert the public as to changes in rating models that impacted 
the value of their ratings.33 And they allowed “out of model adjustments” (that is, material 
exceptions) to their ratings of certain securities which again threw the value of the rating into 
question.34 
As a result, at the peak of the boom, they collected fees and did insufficient work to earn 
them.  As with all recent financial crises, there is the obligatory smoking gun internal email: one 
rating agency employee wrote to another that a transaction “could be structured by cows and we 
would rate it.”35 Understaffing appeared rampant at the agencies.  Again, an employee emails 
another a harmful admission: “staffing issues, of course, make it difficult to deliver the value that 
justify our fees.”36 
This take on the rating agencies can be played out with nearly all of the financial services 
sectors that have been addressed at today’s conference: government sponsored enterprises like 
Fannie and Freddie; commercial banks; and investment banks, to name just some of the leading 
ones.  And that is why, to a large extent, we have gone from firm level risk to systemic risk—the 
short term incentives in each of these industries led to a sacrifice of long term health for all.  For 
                                                 
31 SEC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 23–27. 
32 One ratings agency manager wrote to another that ratings agencies were continuing to create an “‘even bigger 
monster— the CDO market. Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters.’” Id. at 
12,  n.8. 
33 Id. at 13–14. 
34 Id. at 14. 
35 Id. at 12. 
36 Id. . 
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rating agencies, reputational harm will likely lead to increased regulation. European regulators 
are likely to take the lead in this regard, but the SEC may act as well.37  
As news of the credit crisis gets more and more complex, with detail piling on detail, it is 
important to remember that a fundamental understanding of our situation often derives from the 
fundamentals. Reputation matters, as does its key components: trust, transparency and 
leadership.  The systemic risk posed by numerous firms failing to maintain their reputations will 
lead to a new era of regulation that will impose more obligations on firms that could not live up 
to the ones that they themselves had espoused. 
                                                 
37 See Joe Kirwin, Securities Regulators in EU, Elsewhere Fault Plan to Tighten Credit Rating Agency Rules, 40 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1489 (2008); Malini Manickavasagam, SEC Proposes More NRSRO Regulation, Especially for 
Structured Finance Ratings, 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 929 (2008); see also Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating 
Agencies, 82 WASH U. L.Q. 43, 57–59 (2004) (noting  that outcry from previous, similar financial scandals 
accelerated regulatory reform efforts aimed at rating agencies). 
